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Abstract
The paper extends the Salop model of localized competition by allowing firms to
have heterogeneous costs. We provide a general but highly tractable analytical solution
for the equilibrium prices, and we study the long-run properties of the model using
two different entry games. We show that cost heterogeneity affects the efficiency of the
market equilibrium by increasing welfare and inducing less excessive entry. Further, we
illustrate the positive effects of the existence of a selection mechanism, which induces
less efficient firms not to start production. The model also replicates some recent
results on dense markets.
JEL classification: L11, D61.
Keywords: Localized competition; market efficiency, cost heterogeneity; large
markets.
1 Introduction
The economic analysis of monopolistically competitive market structures has developed
around two main methodological workhorses: the Hotelling-Salop and the Dixit-Stiglitz-
Krugman (D-S-K) approaches. In the former, the market is represented by a circle where
all firms sell an identical product whose differentiation is a direct function of the distance
between the locations, defined in either a geographical or a product characteristics’ space,
of a consumer and of the firms serving the market. The latter is based on the idea that
consumers have a preference for varieties so that each firm produces a different product.
Which of these set-ups is used to analyze a particular market is often an empirical matter
that crucially depends on whether competition is localized - which would favor the use of
the Hotelling-Salop approach - or global.
Chamberlin (1956)’s original view of monopolistic competition encompassed the no-
tions that firms are different and that product differentiation among firms imply differences
aE-mail: m.alderighi@univda.it.
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in firms characteristics, e.g. managerial abilities may differ, access to input markets may
vary, etc. Nonetheless, the two main theoretical approaches to monopolistic competition
have generally assumed identical firms. The need to better link empirical results with
the theoretical literature calls for the development of models where firms’ heterogeneity
is explicitly taken into account. For example, recently Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) have,
amongst other things, extended the D-S-K model by allowing different marginal costs of
production.
While the implications of introducing cost heterogeneity in the Hotelling linear city
model have been amply investigated in the literature (e.g., see: Bester, 1992; Piga, 1998),
the Salop (1979)’s circular city model has been generally studied by assuming firms with
identical marginal costs, with the notable exceptions of Syverson (2004) and Vogel (2008).
In this paper we delve deep into the short- and long-run properties of the Salop’s model
when firms’ costs are heterogeneous, thereby clarifying and extending some previous results
obtained in the existence literature on localized competition.
We begin by offering a more in-depth understanding of firms’ price setting behaviour
in the Salop’s model, by allowing any generic number of firms to differ in their efficiency
levels. Assuming that firms’ costs and locations are common knowledge, our analytical
solution of the equilibrium prices generalizes and confirms the intuitions put forward in
Syverson (2001) that prices should be a weighted average of all the firms’s costs, that
weights should decrease with distance and should sum to one. Weights are also found
to be independent of the cost differential between any pairs of firms and turn out to
converge very quickly to a stable value as the number of firms increases. Such properties
of the equilibrium weights are not imposed on the solution but constitute its intrinsic
characteristics. Finally, allowing for cost heterogeneity entails that a highly efficient firm
may have an incentive to drive a highly inefficient neighbour from the market; to prevent
this from occurring we derive the condition on the maximum allowable cost gap such that
the “no mill price undercutting” rule, first proposed by Eaton and Lipsey (1978), holds in
a subgame perfect Nash-price equilibrium.
After deriving a general result for the full information equilibrium price, the paper
investigates how cost heterogeneity affects the long-run equilibrium market structure in
two different entry games, each having price competition as the final stage. Contrary to
the two-stage perfect information game in Salop (1979), the decision to enter is taken
under uncertainty. Indeed, the first entry game here assumes firms learn both their and
their rivals’ production costs and locations only after incurring a sunk entry fee. Because
expected profit increases with the cost variance, an interesting result is that under a free-
entry zero profit condition more firms choose to operate than in the case where firms have
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all identical costs. Spulber (1995) shows a similar relationship between expected profits
and cost uncertainty for the case of Bertrand competition with firms setting prices when
they know their own, but not their rivals’, cost. He argues that asymmetric information
stimulates competition by providing incentives for firms to invest in the set-up costs of
entry.
Nonetheless, relative to the first-best outcome that would be chosen by a social plan-
ner, in our study the free entry long-run equilibrium under cost asymmetry exhibits a
lower degree of excessive entry.1 Furthermore, in the welfare analysis we show that cost
heterogeneity determines a production allocative inefficiency, which does not arise in the
homogeneous firms’ case. Indeed due to the weighting system, highly (in)efficient firms
find it optimal to increase (decrease) their prices so that (in)efficient firms end up with a
smaller (larger) market share.
In the second entry game under study, the dynamics of entry is split into two stages.
First, firms have to pay an entry fee in order to learn their production cost realization,
but not that of their rivals; second, since firms with a high cost draw may not survive
the competition of a highly efficient neighbor, a selection stage determines the firms that
can profitably pay a fixed fee in order to enter the production stage. Such a set-up,
complemented with the full-information price competition stage, shares with Nocke (2006),
Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) and Syverson (2004) the result that larger markets select more
efficient firms, i.e., from an empirical point of view denser markets should be characterized
by lower inefficiency and price dispersion. Furthermore, we find the selection mechanism
that eliminates the least efficient firms becomes more stringent as the variance of the costs
among all potential producers increases. On the whole, in the more realistic case where
firms have different costs and decide whether to enter under uncertainty, our results point
at market outcomes with better welfare properties than those characterizing the simpler
symmetric case.
To introduce heterogeneity within the basic circular market structure, this paper
adopts a very recent approach, which maintains and extends the original Salop’s set-
up to cope with asymmetric firms. Indeed, our work is related and complements that of
Vogel (2008), which considers a two-stage game in which firms first choose their locations
and then compete in price. In both stages firms have full information about their own and
their rivals’ costs and locations, while entry in this paper occurs under uncertainty. Vogel’s
model has an interesting implication: that lower-cost firms are more isolated in equilib-
rium. The basic idea is that higher-cost firms try to locate themselves further away from
their lower-cost competitors to shield themselves from competition. While the analogies
1See also Creane (2007) for a model where uncertainty may lead to insufficient entry.
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with our set-up are mainly on the pricing game, the interests of the two papers are quite
different, since we extensively discuss the welfare properties of two long-run equilibrium
models.
The other approach followed in the literature includes studies suggesting changes to
either the supply or the demand side of the original set-up. In Bouckaert (2000), firms
can either operate a (traditional) retail store located on the circle or set up a mail order
business operating from the centre and competing with the traditional store in a non-
localized way. The presence of the latter intensifies competition so that a smaller number
of firms are active in equilibrium compared to the Salop’s original model.2 To augment the
standard circular city model, Anderson and de Palma (2000) use a logit specification for
consumers’ tastes to combine spatial location, i.e., localized competition, and consumers’
love for variety (which introduces an element of global competition): their interaction
yields a rich set of qualitative results that can be interpreted in terms of the evolution of
industrial structure over the last two centuries.3 Von Ungern-Sternberg (1991) presents
a model of monopolistic competition where the consumers are located along the edges of
a pyramid and not along a circle. The advantage of this approach is that it allows for
non-localized competition among firms with different production costs, while, at the same
time, it retains some of the features of the circular model.4
The next Section describes the model’s set-up and characterizes the equilibrium prices
as well as the condition for a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. It is followed
by the analysis of the market equilibrium, which is then compared, in Section 4, with
the socially optimum outcome. The three-stage entry game with a selection mechanism
is developed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. The Appendix contains the proofs for all
the Propositions, Lemmas and Corollaries not given in the text.
2The social inefficiency associated with excessive entry is also mitigated, but not completely eliminated,
when firms can price discriminate, both perfectly and imperfectly (Baskar and To, 2004; Liu and Serfes,
2005).
3For instance, (i) a decrease in transport costs is expected to lead to a long-run equilibrium with
fewer and larger firms, and lower prices and; (ii) an increase in population, and hence in market density,
determines a less than proportional increase in the number of firms, so that more product varieties are
available to consumers living in larger cities but; (iii) holding market density constant, the same increase
in population determines that less effective variety is available in larger cities. Our model generates
predictions similar to (i) and (ii); see Nocke (2006) for a result along the same lines as (iii).
4More recently, Chen and Riordan (2007) have proposed the “spokes” model as a another way to
introduce non-localized competition in a spatially differentiated oligopolistic market.
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2 The model
Consider a circular city of unitary length with uniform density D. There are N ≥ 2
equidistant firms,5 whose location is denoted by the sequence of integers:
n ∈ L =
{
l (N) =
⌈
1−N
2
⌉
,
⌈
1−N
2
⌉
+ 1, ··, 0, 1, ··, l (N) =
⌈
N − 1
2
⌉}
,
where dxe is the approximation of x to its larger integer.6 As a convention and without
loss of generality, the chosen notation for firms’ location implies that after attributing
the value l randomly, all the other indexes are assigned in descending order by moving
clockwise (see Figure 1 for an example with N = 12). n unambiguously denotes a firm’s
location, and therefore constitutes an absolute index.
Unit variable costs are cn ≥ 0 with cn ∈ [cL, cH ]. Thus, we allow firms to have different
costs; this may be due to differing managerial abilities across firms (Bartelsman and Doms,
2000), to location-specific factors (Aiura and Sato, 2008) or to different costs in producing
varieties (Montagna, 1995; Waterson, 1990). Throughout the paper we assume that firms
compete by setting their price when costs and locations are common knowledge.
The short-run number of firms, N , is given, e.g., due to entry barriers. Denote the
number of locations separating any two firms as i ∈ L. For firm n, i < 0 identifies the
firm which is its i-step clockwise neighbour, while i > 0 refers to firm n’s i-step counter-
clockwise neighbour. Let 〈〉 identify an operator such that 〈n+ i〉 ∈ L and:
〈n+ i〉 =

n+ i if l ≤ n+ i ≤ l
n+ i−N if n+ i > l
n+ i+N if n+ i < l
Consumers incur linear unit transport costs t, and have unitary inelastic demand.
Consider a consumer who is located at distance d ∈ [0, 1/N ] from firm n. The utility she
obtains from buying the product from firm n is Ud,n = v − td− pn, where v is a positive
constant, and pn is the uniform price charged by firm n. We assume that the reservation
value v is sufficiently high so that consumers buy the good in equilibrium.
5Throughout the paper we assume sufficiently high relocation costs to prevent a firm to want to change
its location, once it has been taken.
6That is, if N = 12, then l (12) = −5 and l (12) = 6, but if N = 11, then l (11) = −5 and l (11) = 5.
For notational convenience, the dependence of l and l on N will not be carried explicitly.
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2.1 Equilibrium prices
Condition 1 (No mill-price undercutting)
∣∣pn − p〈n+1〉∣∣ < kˆ, for n ∈ L, where kˆ = t/N .
Following Eaton and Lipsey (1978), we keep the requirement that competition is lo-
calized: the market share and price setting of a firm located in n is directly affected only
by the behaviour of the two adjacent firms. That is, firms do not reduce prices in such a
way to grab all the market of one or both 1-step neighbours. However, satisfying Condi-
tion 1 does not necessarily produce a Nash equilibrium in prices because a highly efficient
firm could undercut and drive a highly inefficient 1-step neighbour from the market. We
will now characterize the analytical solution for the equilibrium prices, leaving the deriva-
tion of the conditions on costs under which the Nash price equilibrium exists to the next
sub-section.
Standard computations yield firm n’s demand (Tirole, 1988, p. 283):
qn = D ·
(
1
N
+
p〈n−1〉 + p〈n+1〉 − 2pn
2t
)
, n ∈ L; (1)
firm n’s profit function is thus: Πn = (pn − cn) · qn. Concavity of the profit function in
pn implies that the optimal prices for the N firms are given by the first order conditions:
pn =
2cn + p〈n−1〉 + p〈n+1〉
4
+
1
2
kˆ, ∀n ∈ L. (2)
Lemma 1 If Condition 1 is satisfied, then system (2) has a unique solution:
p∗n =
∑l
i=l
wl−|i|c〈n+i〉 + k, n ∈ L. (3)
Although competition is localized, Lemma 1 highlights the inter-connection of all firms’
pricing strategies, an aspect that does not feature in a symmetric costs set-up. Consider
the firm in n = 0 (Figure 1 ). From (2), the price charged by firm 0 depends on its costs
and on the prices charged by its adjacent firms. The latter’s prices depend on their own
costs and by the price charged by, respectively, firm 0 and their respective other 1-step
neighbour. Similarly, the price charged by the 2-step neighbours of firm 0 depends on their
own costs and on the price charged by their 1-step neighbours, and so on and so forth. In
other words, despite the localized competition assumption, the total market is the result
of chain-linked sub-markets (Chamberlin, 1956, p. 102; Rothchild, 1982), so that each
firm’s cost influences the pricing of the non-direct competitors through a domino effect.
The degree of interconnection between firms’ costs and prices is captured by the set of
weights wi, while k is an average mark-up reflecting the degree of substitutability across
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products (as in standard homogeneous cost models).
It is worth noting that the adopted conventional notation assigns the weight with the
highest subscript to a firm’s own cost, and that, for even N , w0 corresponds to the weight
for the cost of the firm which is opposite (i.e., furthest) to firm 0 (see Figure 1); for an odd
N , w0 is the weight for both firms l and l. Interestingly, the weights are not influenced
by the cost differential between firm n and its i-step neighbours. That is, each firm in
the market assigns the same weight to the cost of a firm regardless of the level of that
cost. Furthermore, due to the domino effect the weights are also expected to decrease with
respect to distance, that is, w0 < w1 < .. < wl.
Proposition 1 (Characterization) Assume the existence of a Nash price equilibrium,
which satisfies Condition 1; then for any N ≥ 2, the solution is unique and it is given by
(3) of Lemma 1, where the weights wi and k are:
wi = 4wi−1 − wi−2 for i = 1, ..l − 1 (4a)
w1 =
(
3− l − l)w0 (4b)
4wl = 2 + 2wl−1 (4c)∑l
i=l
wl−|i| = 1, (4d)
k = kˆ = t/N. (5)
(Sketch of the proof.) While a formal proof is shown in the Appendix, here we
provide the intuition behind the derivation of (4) and (5) assuming N is even. From
Lemma 1, firm 0’s equilibrium strategy is of the form:
p0 = wlc0 + wl−1 (c−1 + c+1) + wl−2 (c−2 + c+2) + ...+ w0cl + k. (6)
By the same token, using the shift in weights’ notation described in Figure 1, the price
charged by the adjacent firms located at +1 and −1, respectively, are:
p−1 = wlc−1 + wl−1 (c−2 + c0) + wl−2 (c−3 + c+1) + ...+ w0cl−1 + k (7)
p+1 = wlc+1 + wl−1 (c0 + c+2) + wl−2 (c−1 + c+3) + ...+ w0cl + k. (8)
Now substituting (6), (7) and (8) in (2), with n = 0, and collecting the similar terms, we
obtain:
c0
(
4wl − 2− 2wl−1
)
+ (c−1 + c1)
(
4wl−1 − wl−2 − wl
)
+ (c−2 + c2)
(
4wl−1 − wl − wl−2
)
+ ..
..+
(
cl + cl−1
)
(4w1 − w0 − w2) + cl (4w0 − 2w1) +
(
2k − 2kˆ
)
= 0. (9)
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In order for this equality to hold for every possible configuration of cn, n ∈ L, all the
expressions in round brackets must be equal to zero, thereby proving (4a)-(4c) and (5).
Finally, (4d) emerges by replacing cn = c for n ∈ L in (9).7
Given (4d), when firms have identical costs cn = c, ∀n ∈ L, (3) reduces to the standard
solution in Salop (1979): pn = c+ kˆ, ∀n.
Proposition 1 highlights the relationship among the weights wis in Lemma 1; however
finding their numerical values using (4) can be computationally burdensome, because it
would be necessary to solve a system of d(N + 1) /2e equations. We now provide a simpler
way to compute them.
Corollary 1 Let:
a (i) = 4a (i− 1)− a (i− 2) , for i = 2, ..l, (10a)
a (0) = 1, a (1) = 3− l − l, and (10b)
AN =
∑l
i=l
a
(
l − |i|) . (10c)
Then
wi = a (i) /AN . (11)
The recursive nature of (10) facilitates the computation of the weights given the initial
conditions (10b). Corollary 1 is used in Table 1 to obtain the numerical values of the
optimal weights for N = 2, 3, .., 15, 20,∞.
[Insert Table 1]
From Table 1 one can observe that for N > 7, the weights associated to a firm’s own
cost and to those of the three closest neighbours are, respectively, about 57.7%, 15.5%,
4.2% and 1.4%, and that such weights remain almost constant as N increases. For N ≥ 8,
the costs of the firms that are farther than 3 steps have a highly negligible impact on the
price set by some other firm in the market (R = 1 −∑min(3,l)i=max(−3,l)wl−i is less than 1%).8
Therefore, given the weights’ high speed of convergence, even for a relatively small N the
following limiting result can be used to derive a good approximation of equilibrium prices.
Corollary 2 When N → ∞, for every i, then wl → y = 1/
√
3; wl−i/wl−i−1 → x =
2 +
√
3; wl−i → y · x−i.
7Strictly speaking, only two conditions among (4b), (4c) and (4d) are necessary to derive all the weights.
8Pinkse et al. (2002) analyze competition among wholesalers of oil refined products by using a number
of closeness measures to proxy for the degree of product differentiation: only the coefficient for the nearest
neighbor rival price is significant and economically meaningful. Their estimates reveal that direct rivalry
decays abruptly with distance, suggesting that competition is highly localized.
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2.2 Price equilibrium existence and uniqueness
We now show the existence of the equilibrium in Proposition 1 under two related firms’
behavioural assumptions; in the first firms commit themselves to Condition 1, in the second
this same condition holds without any commitment on the firm’s part. In both cases we
need to impose some restrictions on the cost differential between two neighbouring firms
either because otherwise the no-mill price condition would fail to hold, or because the
efficiency gap may be such that a highly efficient firm can profitably undercut a 1-step
inefficient neighbour and drive it from the market.
Proposition 2 (Existence and Uniqueness under firms’ commitment to Condition 1)
Equations (3)-(5) represent a unique Nash price equilibrium in pure strategies, if the max-
imum cost differential is not too large relative to the degree of product differentiation:
cH − cL < ρc (N) kˆ, (12)
where kˆ = t/N and ρc (N) =
(
wl − w0
)−1.
Although largely used in the literature, assuming a commitment to the no-mill price
undercutting condition is restrictive because it does not generally lead to undercut-proof
prices. Without commitment, the efficiency gap may be such that a highly efficient firm
can profitably undercut a 1-step inefficient neighbour and drive it from the market unless
we impose a restriction stronger than (12).
Proposition 3 (Existence and Uniqueness) Equations (3)-(5) represent a unique Nash
price equilibrium in pure strategies, if the maximum cost differential is not too large relative
to the degree of product differentiation:
cH − cL < ρ (N) kˆ, (13)
• ρ (2) = ρc (2) = 3;
• ρ (N) = 1A
(
B −√B2 −A
)
for N ≥ 3,
A = (1− wl−1)2 − (1− wl)2 − (1− wl−1) (wl − wl−2),
B = (1− wl−1);
• limN→∞ ρ (N) = ρ¯ ' 0.60974.
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First, when N = 2 firms have no incentive to undercut the rivals, because ρ(2) =
ρc(2) = 3. That is, the equilibrium in two-firm Hotelling type game is always undercut-
proof (Hamilton et al., 1991).
Second, the values of ρc and ρ as a function of N are reported in Table 2. Clearly, for
N ≥ 3, ρc is about three times greater than ρ because an under-cut proof equilibrium is
incompatible with excessive cost heterogeneity. Many authors have noted that, in horizon-
tal product differentiation models, the non-existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies
is due to the small degree of product differentiation (d’Aspremont et. al., 1979).9 Simi-
larly, in our case, as N increases conditions (12) and (13) become more stringent because
kˆ = t/N , ρc and ρ decrease in N .
Finally, both Propositions provide a sufficient condition for the existence and unique-
ness of the Nash equilibrium in pure strategies which hold under every possible costs’
structure. Different assumptions on the latter would generally lead to a less stringent
specification of conditions (12) and (13). For instance, if the costs of two neighbouring
firms are positively correlated (e.g., because costs depend on the distance from an input
source), then intuitively a Nash equilibrium would still exist even if the constraint on
cH − cL were relaxed.
3 Long-run equilibrium
Suppose the number of firms is not given, but that it is endogenously determined. Fol-
lowing Salop (1979), in this section we consider a simple two-stage entry game with the
entry stage followed by the production stage. In the first stage, those potential entrants
choosing to enter have to pay a set-up cost F , the others remain out of the market and
gain zero profit. Before paying F , each potential entrant only knows the costs distribution
but has no information on the actual realization of its own and its potential opponents’
costs.10 After investing F and occupying a random equidistant location, in the production
stage competition takes place among the N entrants as in Section 2, so that locations and
costs are common knowledge. We solve the model by backward induction. The price equi-
librium in the production stage is therefore given by Propositions 1 under the existence
conditions of Propositions 2 and 3.
9An equilibrium in mixed strategies has been proved to exist for the Hotelling linear city case (Dasgupta
and Maskin, 1986).
10This is an important difference with Vogel (2008), which nonetheless shows that symmetric locations
would be chosen by firms with same costs. Intuitively, under full uncertainty, firms are in expectation all
ex-ante identical and would therefore choose, as we assume, to locate equidistantly.
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3.1 Entry phase
To derive the properties of the long-run equilibrium, we assume that costs are identically
and independently distributed:
Assumption 1 Let c˜n ∈ [cL, cH ] be a random variable with distribution G, mean value
E [cn] = c¯, variance E
[
(cn − c¯)2
]
= σ2 and covariance E [(cn − c¯) cm] = 0, ∀n,m ∈ L and
n 6= m.
Firms are risk-neutral and have perfect foresight, so that they enter the market if their
expected profit is non-negative. Since costs are unknown in the first stage, firm n’s random
profit is:
Π˜n =
D
t
(p˜n − c˜n) · 12
(
p˜〈n−1〉 + p˜〈n+1〉
)− p˜n + kˆ)− F , (14)
where the superscript ∼ denotes stochastic variables.
Proposition 4 The expected profit of firm n is:
E
[
Π˜n
]
=
D
t
(
σ2WI (N) + kˆ2
)
− F (15)
• WI (N) =
∑l
i=l wl−|i|
[(
wl − wl−1
)− (wl−|i| − wl−|i+1|)] > 0, with w−1 := wl+l;
• limN→∞WI (N) = W¯I = 1− 49
√
3 ' 0.23020.
The values of WI (N) are reported in Table 2: they monotonically decrease for N ≥ 3,
and rapidly converge toward W¯I . From Proposition 4, the expected profit E
[
Π˜n |N
]
decreases in N and F and increases in D, σ and t.11 An interesting result is that the
expected profits increase with cost heterogeneity. This is due to the profit function being
convex in ci so that, for the Jensen inequality, E (Π(c˜)) > Π(E(c˜)) (Spulber, 1995). For
instance, in the extreme case where any two adjacent firms’ costs are perfectly negatively
correlated, i.e., E
[
(cn − c¯) c〈n+1〉
]
= −σ2 and N is even, it can be shown that the expected
profit (15) reduces to E [Π] = Dt
(
kˆ2 + 49σ
2
)
−F.12 That is, firms prefer to “gamble” even
if there is a fifty-fifty chance of drawing a high cost. Furthermore, when there is perfect
11Taking the derivative of E
[
Π˜n |N
]
with respect to t, we obtain that the expected profit is increasing
in t when σ < kˆ/
√
WI ' 2.09kˆ. In the support [cl, ch] the maximal variance arises from a distribution
where all the mass is equally concentrated on the extremes: σ= (ch − cl)/2; hence, under (12) and (13)
the expected profit is always increasing in t for any distribution.
12Perfect negative correlation is obtained when the 1-step neighbors of a cl-type firm are ch-types, and
viceversa. Calculations are available on request.
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positive pairwise correlation among costs, σ2 = 0 and the profits are the same as the case
of no uncertainty (i.e., Salop).
Proposition 5 From Proposition 4, the equilibrium number of firms in the market, NM ,
is implicitly given by the following equation:
D ·
(
t
N2M
+
σ2
t
WI (NM )
)
= F
For N large, the number of firms is approximated by:
NM '
√
t
F/D − W¯Iσ2/t (16)
It is noteworthy that NM converges to the value in Salop (1979) when firms’ costs
are identical, i.e., NM =
√
tD/F when σ2 = 0. More importantly, the game with cost
heterogeneity yields a higher number of firms in equilibrium, relative to that in the tra-
ditional case. However, the two cases are not perfectly comparable given the different
informational structure they assume. Therefore, in order to gauge the extent to which the
free-entry outcome is excessive, we need to establish how the free-entry equilibrium under
cost heterogeneity differs from the socially optimum outcome.
4 Welfare analysis
In the spirit of Salop (1979), in this Section we compare the free-entry market equilibrium
in Proposition 5 with the first-best optimum that would be chosen by a social planner.
It is worth stating up-front that relative to the welfare analysis in Salop (1979), in the
present case we have to consider how the socially optimal definition of each firm’s market
share impacts on the total production cost incurred in the economy. This is tantamount
to assessing whether the market equilibrium pricing rules induce allocative inefficiency so
that consumers who should patronize a low-cost firm end up buying from a higher cost
firm.
4.1 Production
Assume there are N firms already settled on the circle, with a generic firm n having
cost cn ∈ [cL, cH ]. We focus on the generic arc of length 1N defined by the locations
of firms 〈n− 1〉 and n. Because demand is inelastic, the first-best allocative solution is
reached when the sum of production and transport costs is minimized. The solution to
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this problem, which is worked out when the planner has learnt the cost realization in each
location, is equivalent to finding the optimal allocation of consumers between two adjacent
firms. However, unlike the standard case, where the planner splits the arc evenly among
firms, optimality under cost heterogeneity may require that the most efficient firms supply
a larger proportion of the market even if this increases transport costs.
Let dn and d〈n−1〉=
(
1
N −dn
)
be the distance of the pivotal consumer from two adjacent
firms. The average distance between a generic consumer on the arc and the seller she
patronizes is:
d¯ = N
(∫ d〈n−1〉
0
xdx+
∫ dn
0
xdx
)
=
N
2
(
d2〈n−1〉 + d
2
n
)
. (17)
Hence, the average transport costs among all consumers on the arc is:
TC = d¯t =
N
2
(
d2〈n−1〉 + d
2
n
)
t (18)
The proportion of consumers patronizing firm 〈n− 1〉 and firm n are, respectively,
Nd〈n−1〉 and Ndn. The average (variable) cost of producing goods for a consumer on the
arc is:
V C = Nd〈n−1〉c〈n−1〉 +Ndncn (19)
The social planner problem can be expressed as:
min
dn≥0
(TC + V C) =
N
2
((
1
N
− dn
)2
+ d2n
)
t+N
(
1
N
− dn
)
c〈n−1〉 +Ndncn (20)
Therefore,
d∗n =
1
2N
+
(
c〈n−1〉 − cn
2t
)
. (21)
Because d∗n ≥ 0, then (21) holds if cH − cL < kˆ.
The implementation of (21) can be obtained by using prices as policy instruments.
From:
d〈n−1〉 =
1
2N
+
pn − p〈n−1〉
2t
; dn =
1
2N
+
p〈n−1〉 − pn
2t
(22)
we obtain:
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Lemma 2 The first-best full information allocative solution can be obtained by setting:
pFn = cn + kF , (23)
where kF can be set freely with the only caution that the delivered price does not exceed
the reservation price of consumers.
Comparing (3) and (23), it immediately follows that if firms have heterogeneous costs,
for any given N , the market prices determine a distortive allocative effect. Indeed, when
firms have heterogeneous costs their optimizing behavior induces them not only to base
their prices on their own costs (as in the first best situation) but also on those of the
opponents. That is, for given k, efficient firms charge prices above the first best solution
and inefficient ones generally charge prices below it.
4.2 Entry
In Section 3.1 the decision on entry is made under uncertainty. Equivalently, here we study
the planner’s long-run choice using Assumption 1, so that the first-best optimal number of
firms is such that it minimizes the expected sum of transport, production and fixed costs.
Using (18), (19), (21) and Assumption (1), the expected average transport cost E [TC]
and the expected average (variable) cost of production E [V C] are:
E [TC] =
t
4N
+
1
2
N
t
σ2; E [V C] = c¯− N
t
σ2.
Finally, fixed costs per consumer are: FC = NF/D. Hence, the expected average total
cost:
E [C] = E [TC + V C + FC] =
(
t
4N
+
1
2
N
t
σ2
)
+
(
c¯− N
t
σ2
)
+
NF
D
(24)
Proposition 6 The first-best optimal number of firms is:
NF =
1
2
√
t
F/D − 0.5σ2/t (25)
Discussion. Note from (24) that an increase in cost heterogeneity, captured by σ, in-
creases transport costs less than it reduces the production costs because the planner can
shift production towards the more efficient plants. Thus, our analysis highlights a welfare-
enhancing effect of cost heterogeneity, whose overall impact has to be investigated within
the limits imposed by Propositions (2) and (3). Indeed, for any G with support [cL, cH ]
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it must be that σ ≤ (cH − cL) /2 and therefore, given that ρc > ρ, the condition on (12)
allows the analysis of cases with larger allowable cost diversity than under condition (13).13
With regards to the socially optimal number of firms, from (16), (25) and W¯I < 0.5,
we have that NM/NF < 2 when σ > 0, while this ratio is equal to 2 when firms’ costs
are identical (Salop, 1979). The condition (12) determines a lower bound for NM/NF .
Numerical simulations run imposing 0 ≤ σ ≤ (cH − cL) /2 = (0.16) /2 show that NM/NF
is indeed monotonically decreasing in σ and reaches a minimum value around 1.78.14 That
is, the greater the degree of heterogeneity, the less excessive market entry is.
In terms of the overall costs (24), we can compare market efficiency under different
regulatory scenarios. To emphasize the role of cost heterogeneity, our simulation analysis
assumes the maximum value of costs’ variance satisfying condition (12). Figure 2 shows
the relationship between the number of firms and the expected average total cost E [C]
under three different pricing schemes: uniform (the regulator imposes the same price for
all firms; this is equivalent to the case where cn = c¯ for all n), market (prices are set
according to Proposition 1), first-best (the marginal cost pricing in (23)).15 The same
Figure reports the first-best number of firms as well as the long-run equilibrium under
free entry. Obviously, the first-best solution in F has the highest level of welfare, but its
implementation requires the gathering of information on each firm’s cost. It also implies
having consumers that pay different mill prices, which may not be a politically viable
strategy. Nonetheless, the uniform pricing outcome in U is highly inefficient relative
to F . The expected total social cost in point U is slightly lower than in M , but the
latter does not require any regulatory intervention. Relative to the uniform case, some
welfare gains can be achieved if the planner decides to regulate entry by moving the
market outcome from M to S, the latter being closer to F than to U . To conclude,
when the implementation of the first-best outcome is infeasible, in the presence of large
cost heterogeneity the market outcome is almost welfare-equivalent to the outcome that
would arise when a regulator combines a uniform price with entry restrictions.16 Welfare-
13For instance, when G is uniform σ = (ch − cl) /2
√
3, but when all the mass is equally concentrated on
the extremes: σ = (ch − cl) /2.
14The other values were: F = t = 1, D = 100, c¯ = 0.1. When the same simulation was run under
condition (13) the lower bound was about 1.97. Note however, that smaller lower bounds could have been
achieved by explicitly dealing with the integer problem.
15E [C] can be expressed more succinctly in terms of the pricing scheme using the following:
E [C] = 1
4
kˆ + c¯+NF/D − σ2kˆ−1χ, where χ = 0 under uniform pricing, χ ' 0.65 under market pricing,
and χ = 1 under first-best pricing.
16The econometric evidence in Schaumans and Verboven (2006) on the Belgian pharmacies market
provides support to this argument: the current regime with restricted entry and high regulated markups
seems to protect the private interests of pharmacies. Its replacement with a new regime with free entry
and reduced markups appears likely to generate substantial cost savings to consumers without the risk of
reducing the availability of supply.
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improvements should be therefore achieved not by regulating prices, but by limiting entry,
which leaves open the question of how the regulator can induce entry of the most efficient
potential entrants. In the next Section we present an entry game where such a selection
is endogenously determined within a market mechanism.
5 Long-run equilibrium with selection
In this Section we consider a more sophisticated three stage entry game, which includes a
pre-entry and a selection stage; in the latter, a firm’s decision to enter in the production
(price competition) stage depend on the cost drawn in the previous stage. The timing is
as follows.
Stage 1 - Pre-Entry; M firms invest Fe and learn their own cost but not that of their
rivals; they anticipate that in the selection phase M −N firms will not continue;
Stage 2 - Selection; Based on their own cost and on the belief on the rival’s cost, firms
decide whether to stay or exit the market; the remaining firms are those whose costs
are below a certain threshold; they anticipate that the pricing stage will be played
according to the Proposition 1;
Stage 3 - Full Information Pricing; The remaining N firms incur a fixed set-up cost
Fp and set their prices under a full information scenario; i.e., they know their rivals’
costs.
When Fe = F and Fp = 0, we go back to the previous long-run equilibrium discussed
in Section 3. The timing reflects the empirical evidence suggesting that firms do actually
sink resources before learning their costs (as in Stage 1) and that selection constitutes an
essential element in competitive industries, which is for instance revealed by higher exit
rates for young plants (Dunne et al., 1989; Foster et al., 2006).
There is an important difference between the structure of our game and that presented
in Syverson (2004) where firms set their prices based only on their cost type but not on
their rivals’ actual cost realizations. While this may be a realistic assumption in the short-
run, our approach closely mimics a complete information, long-run equilibrium where firms
have learnt to set prices from which they would not unilaterally want to deviate (which,
given Proposition 1, implies a full knowledge of all the firms’ costs and locations as in
Vogel (2008)).
We solve the model by backward induction. The firms’ profits in stage 3 are computed
using Proposition 1. Throughout the Section, restrictions (13) or (12) on maximal cost
heterogeneity are maintained.
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5.1 Selection
In the second stage, a generic firm n knows cn, M and the prior distribution of costs G.
The assumptions on the distribution of G are given by Assumption 1. Because costs are
randomly and independently distributed, learning its own cost does not change a firm’s
beliefs on its rivals’ costs. Nonetheless, in the selection phase firms can form their beliefs
as to the cost distribution that will emerge in the price competition stage, where only
a subset N ≤ M of firms may be involved. Based on such beliefs, each firm assumes a
posterior distribution of the opponents’ costs Ge, which reflects each firm’s beliefs on its
rivals’ decision on whether to stay or exit the market.
Under the assumption that there is at least one opponent that is going to enter the
market, the expected profit (gross of pre-entry fee Fe) of firm n, if it enters the market
(together with N − 1 ≥ 1 other competitors) is:
EGe
[
Π˜n|cn, N,M
]
=
D
2t
· EGe
[
(p˜n − cn) ·
(
p˜〈n−1〉 + p˜〈n+1〉 − 2p˜n + 2kˆ
)]
− Fp
=
D
t
· EGe
[
(p˜n − cn) ·
(
p˜〈n−1〉 − p˜n + kˆ
)]
− Fp, (26)
where EGe means that the expectations are taken using firm n’s expected cost distribution
on entrants, Ge. The second line in (26) derives from the fact that in stage 2 firm n treats
p˜〈n−1〉 and p˜〈n+1〉 in an identical manner. Further, even if firm n is a monopolist, its profit
must be bounded from above, since it is limited by the consumers’ willingness to pay v.
Therefore EGe
[
Π˜n|cn, 1,M
]
= D (v − cn − t/2) − Fp < ∞.17 Define c¯e = EGe
(
c〈n+i〉
)
,
σ2e = EGe
(
c〈n+i〉
(
c〈n+i〉 − c¯e
))
, ∀i 6= 0.
Proposition 7 Under Assumption 1,
a) the expected profit of firm n is given by:
EGe
[
Π˜n|cn, N,M
]
=
D
t
((
wd (c¯e − cn) + kˆ
)2
+WII (N)σ2e
)
− Fp, (27)
where wd =
(
1− wl
)
=
(
wl − wl−1
)
, WII (N) =
∑
i=L0 wl−|i|
(
wl−|i+1| − wl−|i|
)
> 0, L0 ≡
L\ {0}, limN→∞WII (N) = W¯II = 29
√
3− 13 ' 0.051567.
b) EGe
[
Π˜n|cn, N,M
]
is decreasing in cn and Fp, and increasing in c¯e and D.
Proposition 7 holds for each firm and for each possible N . Thus, sequential rationality
leads to the conclusion that each firm expects that the opponents deciding to enter the
17The case of monopoly can generate problems of existence of equilibria when the market is too small
for two firms but large enough for one firm. See for example Levin and Peck (2003) for a detailed analysis
on entry with at least two potential entrants.
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market are sufficiently efficient, i.e., their cost is not greater than a threshold level α.
Therefore, the posterior distribution of such firms’ costs corresponds to the prior distri-
bution G(x) truncated at α. That is, Ge (x) = Gα (x) = min {G (x) /G (α) , 1}.
Conjectures on α ∈ [cL, cH ] also affect the number of firms that participate to the
pre-entry stage: N˜ = N˜ (α,M). Since cost distributions are independent, we compute
the probability that there are η ≤M (including n) firms whose costs fall under the entry
thresold α:
ωη = Pr
(
N˜=η
)
=G (α)η (1−G (α))M−η .
It follows that if firm n decides to enter the market, provided that in the first stage
there are M firms, its expected profit is:18∑M
η=1
ωηEGα
[
Π˜n|cn, η,M
]
(28)
For given cn, M and α, (28), by accounting for any possible industry configuration, rep-
resents the expected profit in the selection phase. Equivalently, for M large, the central
theorem guarantees that N˜(α,M)→ N(α,M) = G (α)M since ωN → 1 ; (28) becomes:
EGα
[
Π˜n|cn,M
]
= EGα
[
Π˜n|cn, G (α)M,M
]
(29)
In the subsequent analysis, we assume M large so that the expected profit can be
approximated by equation (29). Note that EGα
[
Π˜n|cn,M
]
retains most of the properties
of EGe
[
Π˜n|cn, N,M
]
in Proposition 7, i.e.
Lemma 3 EGα
[
Π˜n|cn,M
]
is increasing in D and decreasing in cn, Fp and M .
Unlike in previous Sections, the comparative static analysis concerning the impact of
a change in cost heterogeneity on the expected profit is not straightforward; indeed, the
expected profit in (29) is not only affected by σ as in (15), but it also depends on c¯α, σα and
G (α). That is, a mean-preserving change of the distribution Gσ in Gσ´, with σ´ 6= σ, may
produce different results depending on how the probability mass is distributed. One way
to study an increase in heterogeneity can be to assume a stretch of the initial distribution
Gσ to obtain Gσ´ with σ´ > σ.
Assumption 2 Let G = {Gσ, σ ∈ (0, σˆ]} is a family of bounded distributions parametrized
by σ, twice continuously differentiable, with differentiable density gσ, average c¯ and vari-
ance σ2, such that Gσ (x) = Gs
(
x−c¯
σ
)
, where Gs has mean value 0 and variance 1. In
18When firm n decides to enter the market it has costs lower than or equal to α and expects that the
other firms entering the market have costs lower than or equal to α.
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addition, let φ (α, cn,M, σ) = EGσα
[
Π˜n|cn,M
]
, and Φ (α,M, σ) = φ (α, α,M, σ). We re-
quire that:
(A) G ∈ G.
(B) (monotonicity) φ (α, cn,M, σ) is decreasing in α and σ.
(C) (single crossing) φα(α,α,M,σ)φy(α,α,M,σ) <
φα(α,cn,M,σ)
φy(α,cn,M,σ)
for y = M,σ and cn < α.
(D) (convexity)
∫ α
cL
φ (α, cn,M, σ) Γ (cn) dcn < (c¯− cL)φ (α, cL,M, σ)+(α− c¯)φ (α, α,M, σ),
where Γ (cn) =
gσ(cn)+(cn−c¯)dgσ(cn)/dcn
gσ(cL)
.
These assumptions are satisfied by the uniform distribution. Assumption 2.(B) is a
monotonicity requirement. From Lemma (3), it also emerges that Φ (α,M, σ) is decreasing
in α and σ. Assumption 2.(C) is the single crossing condition: it guarantees the uniqueness
of the equilibrium in the overall game. Assumption 2.(D) generally imposes a convexity-
like condition, which is certainly verified if Γ = 1 (as in the uniform case) and φ is convex
in cn.
Under Assumption 2.(B), if Φ (cH ,M, σ) < 0, then for every M , there exists an α∗,
such that: EGα∗
[
Π˜n|cn,M
]
≶ 0 when cn ≷ α∗. Therefore, (30) implicitly defines the
optimal entry threshold α∗:
EGα∗
[
Π˜n|α∗,M
]
= 0 (30)
Lemma 4 Assume that α∗ is given by (30). Then, under Assumption 2:
dα∗
dM
<0;
∂α∗
∂D
|M >0; ∂α
∗
∂σ
|M <0. (31)
When Φ (cH ,M, σ) > 0, α∗ = cH so that: dα
∗
dM = 0;
∂α∗
∂D |M = 0 and ∂α
∗
∂σ |M > 0.
Note how the second inequality of (31) seems to suggest that an increase in the market
density D allows more inefficient firms to profitably stay in the market. However, this
is not an equilibrium result for the full game because the partial derivatives in Lemma
4 are calculated for fixed M ; hence they do not capture how a change in D affects the
equilibrium number of firms in the pre-entry stage.
5.2 Pre-entry
To determine M , we rely on the zero-profit condition. After paying Fe, firm n enters the
selection stage and learns cn and M . If cn ≤ α∗, firm n enters the market and gains
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EGα∗
[
Π˜n|cn,M
]
, otherwise it stays out and gains 0. The expected profit of the pre-entry
stage, gross of the entry fee Fe, is:
E
[
Π˜n|M
]
=
∫ α∗
cL
EGα∗
[
Π˜n|cn,M
]
dG (cn) (32)
Lemma 5 Under Assumption 2, E
[
Π˜n|M
]
is monotonically decreasing in M .
The equilibrium number of entrants in the first stage, MS is implicitly given by:
E
[
Π˜n|MS
]
= Fe, (33)
and NS = MSG (α∗ (MS)). Under Lemma 5 the solution is unique. Comparative static
results are summarized in the following propositions.
Proposition 8 Under Assumption 2,
dα∗
dD
<0;
dMS
dD
>0;
dMS
dFe
<0; (34)
The first inequality mirrors the theoretical predictions in Syverson (2001, 2004): larger
(denser) markets are characterized by higher levels of efficiency, and hence lower prices
(Syverson, 2007). The second and third inequalities constitute a standard result: more
potential entrants are attracted by denser markets and discouraged by higher entry fees.
Market density has a direct and an undirect effect on the equilibrium number of firms,
NS :
dNS
dD
=
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
dMS
dD
G (α∗) + g (α∗)
<0︷ ︸︸ ︷
dα∗ (MS)
dM
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
dMS
dD
MS R 0 (35)
In a denser market, on the one hand, larger profits intensify entry in the first stage,
thereby also increasing the number of firms in the production stage (direct effect); on the
other, the competitive pressure from a larger number of firms push towards the exclusion
of less competitive firms (indirect effect). The overall effect depends on the net balance
between these two forces. Simulations obtained assuming a uniform distribution suggest
that the first effect dominates: NS is increasing in D but at a lower rate than MS .
Proposition 9 Under Assumption 2:
dMS
dσ
>0;
dα∗
dσ
≶ 0 if Φ (cH ,MS , σ) ≶ 0. (36)
20
The first inequality confirms the result in Section 3, that cost heterogeneity increases
expected profits and hence the number of potential entrants. However, the second inequal-
ity illustrates a counterbalancing effect: when selection is active, i.e. α∗ < cH , the cut-off
point is negatively related to costs’ heterogeneity. The latter’s impact on NS follows a
pattern similar to (35), with the difference that in Figure 3, which plots MS , NS and α∗
as a function of (cH − cL), NS is decreasing.19 For low levels of (cH − cL) (and therefore,
variance), the optimal number of firms in the entry stage and in the production stage
coincide (MS = NS and α∗ = cH). However, as heterogeneity increases, the selection
mechanism determines a cut-off point after which α∗ < cH and MS increases at a fast
rate. As in the two-stage game, when the decision to enter is made under uncertainty, an
increase in the costs’ variance leads to an increase in the expected profit in the pre-entry
stage, even when firms can anticipate that in the subsequent selection stage a number of
firms will not continue. Most importantly, the selection mechanism is responsible for the
decreasing trend in NS as it leads to the exit of the MS−NS least efficient firms and to
an increase of the average market efficiency, c¯e = α
∗−cL
2 < c¯.
To further evaluate the effectiveness of the selection mechanism, we investigate the re-
lationship between welfare and firms’ heterogeneity. Figure 4 compares the expected total
costs E[C] in the three-stage selection game with those arising from three previously ana-
lyzed scenarios, all evaluated at the long-run equilibrium number of firms computed using
(16), (25) and (33).20 The simulation shows that as firms’ cost heterogeneity increases,
the intensification of the selection mechanism produces such a gain in efficiency to push
overall welfare towards levels close to those obtainable under uniform pricing regulation.
6 Conclusions
We have introduced firms’ cost heterogeneity in the traditional model of the circular
city (Salop, 1979), and shown that there exists an analytical solution for the equilibrium
prices that holds for any number of firms and any distribution of costs that maintains
localized competition as the relevant behavioral assumption. Our analysis suggests a very
simple price setting rule: price is the weighted average of all firms’ costs (plus the usual
differentiation premium). The weights decrease quite sharply with distance, do not reflect
any cost differential between any firms’ pair and are largely independent of the number of
firms.
19We have chosen the same parameters of Figure 2, assuming that F = 1 is split into Fe = 0.2 and
Fp = 0.8. The simulation further assumes G is uniform, c¯ = 0.1, ch−cl∈ [0, 0.14], D = 100 and t = 1.
20That is: E [C] = 1
4
kˆ+ c¯+NFe/D+MFp/D− σ2kˆ−1χ where N = M = NF , with σ = 0, χ = 0 under
uniform pricing, N = M = NM , χ ' 0.65 under market pricing, N = M = NF , χ = 1 under first-best
pricing, and N = NS , M = MS and χ ' 0.65 under market pricing with selection.
21
Introducing cost heterogeneity in location model opens up a number of interesting
questions in terms of entry and price regulation, that we have only briefly explored. Two
main conclusions seem to emerge from the long-run properties of two entry games. First, in
the presence of large cost heterogeneity, a regulatory approach combining uniform pricing
and entry restrictions is allocatively inefficient relative to the sole regulation on the number
of market participants.
Second, when firms have to pay two entry sunk fees, the first to learn their own cost
realization, the other to enter the production stage, the free market equilibrium endoge-
nously determines a selection process that generates significant (and increasing) welfare
effects starting from intermediate levels of firms’ heterogeneity. Entry into such liberal
professions as accountants, engineers, lawyers, pharmacists, and notaries, fits this theo-
retical framework quite well; the first entry cost being the cost of acquiring professional
accreditation, the second corresponding to the setting-up of the practice or shop.21 Ac-
cording to our results, liberalization is likely to be a welfare-enhancing strategy in those
markets characterized by a certain degree of ex-ante variability in firms’ costs. Our the-
oretical analysis thus supports the stance recently taken by the European Commission
to commit to facilitate the introduction of pro-competitive mechanisms into the liberal
professions’ markets - see the Commission Communication COM (2004) 83. A more in
depth investigation of these, and other issues, is left to future research.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Express the system of equations (2) in matrix form:
AP =
1
2
C +
k
2
1N , where
A =

1 − 14 0 .. .. .. .. 0 − 14
− 14 1 − 14 0 .. .. .. .. 0
0 − 14 1 − 14 0 .. .. .. 0
.. .. .. .. .. .. ..
.. .. .. .. .. 0
0 .. .. .. .. 0 − 14 1 − 14
− 14 0 .. .. .. .. 0 − 14 1

; P =

pl
pl+1
..
p0
..
pl−1
pl

; C =

cl
cl+1
..
c0
..
cl+1
cl−1

.
21The cost to acquire a university degree is generally not sunk, as the degree can be used to pursue a
number of different career options.
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Since A is strictly diagonal dominant by rows (i.e. |aii| >
∑
j 6=i |aij |), it is non singular and
hence the solution of the system is unique (Bhatia, 1997, p. 251). Linearity of (2) also implies
that the solution is linear in cn, i.e. pn =
∑l
i=l wi,nc〈n+i〉 + kn. In addition, the structure of A
also implies that: a) wi,n = wi and kn = k, for n ∈ L, as every i-step shift of the position of all
firms on the circle must not affect the result; b) wi = w−i, as mirroring the position of the firms
on the circle, the result must remain unchanged.
Proof of Proposition 1.
Under Condition 1, the best reply function of firm n is given by (2), for n ∈ L. From Lemma
(1), the solution of the system is unique, and must be of the form given in (3). We show that if
firm n’s adjacent rivals located at 〈n− 1〉 and 〈n+ 1〉 choose p∗〈n−1〉 and p∗〈n+1〉, where the weights
wi and k are given by (4) and (5), respectively, then for firm n it is optimal to set:
p∗n =
∑l
i=l
wl−|i|c〈n+i〉 + k, (37)
with weights given by (4) and (5). Replacing p〈n−1〉 and p〈n+1〉 in (2), we obtain:
pn =
1
4
[
2cn +
(
c〈n+i〉 +
∑l
i=l
wl−|i| · c〈n−1+i〉 + k
)
+
(∑l
i=l
wl−|i| · c〈n+1+i〉 + k
)]
+
1
2
kˆ
We derive the proofs for N even and odd, separately.
Even case: N = 2 is trivial. Consider N ≥ 4. Collect the similar terms for c〈n+i〉, i ∈ L:
pn =
1
4
[∑−1
i=l
(
wl−|i|−1 + wl−|i|+1
)
· c〈n+i〉 + 2
(
1 + wl−1
)
cn+
+
∑l−1
i=+1
(
wl−|i|−1 + wl−|i|+1
)
· c〈n+i〉 + 2w1 · c〈n+l〉
]
+
1
2
(
kˆ + k
)
(38)
Requiring all coefficients of c〈n+i〉 to be the same in (37) and (38), we obtain (4a)-(4c). A
similar reasoning can be used to derive (5). Finally, it is easy to show that (4d) is satisfied, by
replacing cn = c and k = kˆ in (37) and (38), and equating the two expressions.
Odd case: The proof is very similar to the even case. Collecting the similar terms for cn:
pn =
1
4
[
(w0 + w1) cn+l +
∑−1
i=l+1
(
wl−|i|−1 + wl−|i|+1
)
· cn+i + 2
(
1 + wl−1
)
cn+
+
∑l−1
i=+1
(
wl−|i|−1 + wl−|i|+1
)
· cn+i + 2 (w0 + w1) · c〈n+l〉
]
+
1
2
(
kˆ + k
)
.
The only difference with the even case is the second equality of system (4).
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Proof of Corollary 1. We show that wi described in (4) can be generated from system
(10) and (11). Equations (4a), (4b) and (4d) are sufficient to uniquely determine wi (thus 4c
is unnecessary). Let wˆi = a (i) /AN . Rewriting (10a), (10b) and (10c) in terms of wˆi yields,
respectively, (4a), (4b) and (4d), woth wi replaced by wˆi. Thus: wˆi = wi.
Proof of Corollary 2. Because (10a) and (10b) describe a linear recurrence of order two,
with constant coefficients, hence it has a unique closed-form solution. Standard techniques imply
that a (j) = 12
(
2 +
√
3
)j
+ 12
(
2−√3)j in the even case; and a (j) = ( 16√3 + 12) (2 +√3)j +(
1
2 − 16
√
3
) (
2−√3)j in the odd case. Taking l → ∞ then wl/wl−1 = a (l) /a (l − 1) → x =(
2 +
√
3
)
, and more generally wl/wl−i → xi.
Note that 1wl =
A(l)
a(l) =
a(l)
a(l) + 2
a(l−1)
a(l) + 2
a(l−2)
a(l) + .. +
(
3− l − l) a(0)
a(l) . For l large,
1
wl
'
1 + 2
∑l−1
i=1
1
xi . Taking l→∞ then 1wl → 1 +
(√
3− 1) = √3.
Proof of Proposition 2.
(Existence) We start by computing the maximal costs’ differentials cH−cL for which Condition
(1) is satisfied, i.e.: −kˆ < p∗n − p∗〈n−1〉 < kˆ. Without loss of generality, assume that p∗n > p∗〈n−1〉.
Using (3)-(5) yields:
p∗n − p∗〈n−1〉 =
[(
w0 − wl+l
)
c〈n+l〉 +
∑−1
i=−l
(
wl−|i| − wl−|i+1|
)
c〈n+i〉
]
+
[∑l−1
i=0
(
wl−|i| − wl−|i+1|
)
c〈n+i〉
]
.
Because all the terms multiplying the c〈.〉 in the first square bracket are negative, and all those in
the second bracket are positive, the maximal price difference for a given cost differential is given
by choosing c〈n+i〉 = cL, for i = l, ..,−1, l, and c〈n+i〉 = cH for i = 0, .., l − 1. Let:
ρc =
[
−
(
w0 − wl+l
)
−∑−1i=l (wl−|i| − wl−|i+1|)]−1 =[∑l−1i=0 (wl−|i| − wl−|i+1|)]−1>1. Con-
dition (1) is satisfied by (12).
(Uniqueness) It is given by Lemma 1.
Proof of Proposition 3.
(Existence) We focus on the situation in which costs differentials are such that: cH − cL < kˆ.
From (12), p∗ =
(
p∗l , ..p
∗
l
)
given by (3)-(5) satisfies Condition (1). In order to be an equilibrium,
p∗ must be such that, a generic firm n has no unilateral incentive to deviate from p∗n. Assume
that pˆn is a unilateral deviation potentially profitable for firm n. Since Condition 1 ensures the
uniqueness of the solution, we require that pˆn is such that it does not satisfy this Condition.
If pˆn > min
{
p∗〈n−1〉, p
∗
〈n+1〉
}
+ kˆ then firm n is undercut by at least one of the opponents, so
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that its profit is null: therefore this strategy is not profitable.
But if firm n chooses pˆn<max
{
p∗〈n−1〉, p
∗
〈n+1〉
}
−kˆ, it can grab the market of at least one adja-
cent opponent. Clearly, the maximum advantage from deviation emerges when p∗〈n−1〉 and p
∗
〈n+1〉
are as large as possible, so that after undercutting a firm retains the largest margin. Equations
(3)-(5) imply that cL < p∗n− kˆ < cH , n ∈ L. Hence, for a firm with costs sufficiently low relative to
the 1-step rivals, it is possible to choose pˆn > cn such that pˆn ≤ p∗〈n+1〉−kˆ and pˆn ≤ p∗〈n−1〉−kˆ. But
if we assume that cH − cL < kˆ, it is not possible that pˆn > cn and simultaneously pˆn ≤ p∗〈n−2〉−2kˆ
or pˆn ≤ p∗〈n+2〉 − 2kˆ. So firm n can profitable undercut one or both its 1-step opponents but not
any i-step rival, with i >1.
Assume the best possible situation for firm n, i.e., cn = cL and c〈n+i〉 = cH for i ∈ L0 ≡ L\ {0}.
For symmetry p∗〈n+i〉 = p
∗
〈n−i〉 for i ∈ L0. Further, by choosing pn = p∗n, firm n obtains the profit
of: Π∗n =
D
t (p
∗
n − cn)
(
p∗〈n−1〉 − p∗n + k
)
.
If firm n undercuts its rivals, it must choose a price pˆn ≤ p∗〈n−1〉−k, so that its next competitors
become 〈n− 2〉 and 〈n+ 2〉. For analytical convenience, we assume that by choosing pˆn = p∗〈n−1〉−
kˆ, firm n is able to “steal” all the customers of firm 〈n− 1〉 and sells to Dt
(
p∗〈n−2〉 − pˆn + 2kˆ
)
consumers; consequently, the profit it gains is: Dt (pˆn − cn)
(
p∗〈n−2〉 − pˆn + 2k
)
. Since the previous
expression, which is concave in pˆn, is maximized in 12p
∗
〈n−2〉+
1
2cn + kˆ > p
∗
〈n−1〉− kˆ, the maximum
deviation profit Πdn (satifying pˆn ≤ p∗〈n−1〉 − kˆ) is reached when pˆn = p∗〈n−1〉 − kˆ with Πdn =
D
t
((
p∗〈n−1〉 − kˆ
)
− cn
)(
p∗〈n−2〉 −
(
p∗〈n−1〉 − kˆ
)
+ 2kˆ
)
. In order for deviation to be unprofitable,
Π∗n − Πdn > 0. Divide the latter by D/kt and replace p∗n, p∗〈n−1〉 and p∗〈n−2〉, with the respective
analitical expressions provided by (3)-(5), and set γ = (cH − cL) /kˆ to obtain:
((
1− wl
)
γ + 1
) ((
wl − wl−1
)
γ + 1
)− (1− wl−1) ((wl−1 − wl−2) γ + 3) γ > 0.
After some algebra, it emerges that this is satisfied if:
(cH − cL) < ρ (N) kˆ,
where ρ (N) = 1A
(
B −√B2 −A) and A = (1− wl−1)2 − (1− wl)2 − (1− wl−1) (wl − wl−2)
and B =
(
1− wl−1
)
. When N = 2 firms have no incentive to undercut the rivals, so that
ρ (2) = ρc (2) = 3.
(Uniqueness) We show that every profile strategy pˆ 6= p∗ cannot be an equilibrium. Assume
that another price strategy equilibrium vector pˆ 6= p∗ exists. It means that for some n, Condition
1 is not satisfied, i.e. there exists at least one pˆn such that
∣∣pˆn − pˆ〈n+1〉∣∣ > kˆ. Let Lnp be the set
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of firms that in equilibrium do not sell to any consumer. Note that for any pˆ, at least one but
not all firms must sell a positive quantity, i.e. 1 ≤ #Lnp ≤ N − 1. In equilibrium, a firm cannot
have negative profits, otherwise it would prefer to charge a sufficiently high price and sell nothing.
Let n ∈ Lnp. Because n sells nothing, then at least one of the following conditions must hold:
pˆn > pˆ〈n+i〉 + |i| kˆ, for 0 6= i ∈ L. Now, choose ε > 0 sufficiently small. If n charges pˇn = cn + ε, it
can profitably deviate and reach a positive profit, (otherwise at least one active opponent is gaining
negative profits) Hence, assuming the existence of another equilibrium pˆ 6= p∗ is a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 4. Profit (14) can be decomposed as:
E
[
Π˜n
]
=
Dt
N2
− F+
D
2t
{
E
[
p˜np˜〈n−1〉
]− 2E [p˜2n]+ 2E [c˜np˜n]− E [c˜np˜〈n−1〉]− E [c˜np˜〈n+1〉]+ E [cnp˜〈n+1〉]} . (39)
The expected values in (39) are derived in different parts.
Part 4.I Under Assumption 1, if firms set their prices following Proposition (1), then
E
[
(p˜n)
2
]
= σ2WI.0 (N) + c¯2 + 2c¯kˆ + kˆ2 where WI.0 (N) =
∑l
i=l w
2
l−|i| > 0.
Derivation of Part 4.I. From (3): E
[
(p˜n)
2
]
= E
[(∑l
i=l wl−|i| · c˜〈n+i〉 + kˆ
)2]
which can
be decomposed in three terms: E
[(∑l
i=l wl−|i| · c˜〈n+i〉
)2]
+ 2E
[(∑l
i=l wl−|i| · c˜〈n+i〉
)]
kˆ + kˆ2.
Under Assumption 1, we know that E
[
c˜2n
]
=
(
σ2 + c¯2
)
, and, since c˜n and c˜〈n+i〉 are uncorrelated:
E
[
c˜nc˜〈n+i〉
]
= c¯2, with i ∈ L0. After rewriting E
[(∑l
i=l wl−|i| · c˜〈n+i〉
)2]
as:
∑l
i=l
∑l
j=l
wl−|i|wl−|j|E
[
c˜〈n+i〉 · c˜〈n+j〉
]
,
only two types of terms are left: E
[
c˜2n
]
and E
[
c˜nc˜〈n+i〉
]
, i ∈ L0. Further,
∑l
i=l
∑l
j=l wl−|i|wl−|j| =
1. Since the total weight involving E
[
c˜2n
]
terms is WI.0 (N) =
∑l
i=l w
2
l−|i|, we immediately obtain
the thesis. ♦
Part 4.II Under Assumption 1, if firms set their prices following Proposition 1, then
E [p˜np˜n−1] = σ2WI.1 (N) + c¯2 + 2c¯kˆ + kˆ2 where WI.1 (N) =
∑l
i=l wl−|i|wi−|i+1| > 0.
Derivation of Part 4.II. From (3):
E [p˜np˜n−1] = E
[(∑l
i=l
wl−|i| · c˜〈n+i〉 + kˆ
)(∑l
i=l
wl−|i| · c˜〈n+i−1〉 + kˆ
)]
.
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The decomposition of the expected value is similar to that presented in the proof of Part (4.I). To
obtain the proof of the proposition, note that the total weight involving E
[
c˜2n
]
terms is WI.1 (N) =∑l
i=l wl−|i|wl−|i+1|. ♦
Part 4.III Under Assumption 1, if firms set their prices following Proposition 1, then:
a) E [c˜np˜n] = σ2wl + c¯
2 + c¯kˆ; and b) E
[
c˜np˜〈n−1〉
]
= σ2wl−1 + c¯
2 + c¯kˆ.
Derivation of Part 4.III. a) E [c˜np˜n] = E
[
c˜n
(∑l
i=l wl−|i| · c˜n+i + kˆ
)]
. The thesis follows
from the same reasonings of Parts (4.I) and (4.II) by noting that the weight associated to E
[
c˜2n
]
is wl.
b). Similar to a). In this case the weight of E
[
c˜2n
]
is wl−1. ♦
To complete the proof of the Proposition, consider that firms lack information on their own and
their opponents’ costs and locations; therefore E
[
p˜np˜〈n+1〉
]
= E
[
p˜np˜〈n−1〉
]
and E
[
cnp˜〈n+1〉
]
=
E
[
cnp˜〈n−1〉
]
. After substituting the results from Parts 4.I, 4.II, and 4.III into (39), most of
the terms cancel out, finally yielding: E
[
Π˜n
]
= Dt
(
kˆ2 + σ2WI (N)
)
− F , where WI (N) :=
WI.0 − WI.1 + wl − wl−1 =
∑l
i=l wl−|i|
((
wl − wl−|i|
)
−
(
wl−1 − wl−|i+1|
))
. To compute W¯I ,
note that WI (N) =
(
wl − wl−1
)−∑li=l wl−|i| ·(wl−|i| − wl−|i+1|). Using Lemma 1, and choosing
z = x−1, WI (N), for N large enough WI (N) ' (y − zy) +
∑l
i=l
(
yz|i| · yz|i+1|)−∑ii=l (yz|i|)2 =
(y − zy) + y2 z−1z+1 = 1− 49
√
3 ' 0.23020.
Proof of Proposition 5. It derives directly from Proposition 4.
Proof of Proposition 7. Multiply the terms within the square brackets in (26) to obtain:
E
[
p˜np˜〈n−1〉
]−E [p˜2n]+E [p˜n] kˆ− cnE [p˜〈n−1〉]+ cnE [p˜n]− cnkˆ. Each term is derived separately.
Part 7.I Under Assumption 1, if firm n knows its costs but not those of its opponents and in the
final stage prices follow Proposition 1, then
EGe
[
p˜2〈n〉
]
=
((
wlcn +
(
1− wl
)
c¯e
)
+ kˆ
)2
+σ2eWII.0 (N), where WII.0 (N) =
∑
i=L0
(
wl−|i|
)2
.
Derivation of Part 7.I. To save notation, we do not explicitly show the dependence of the
expected value on Ge. Using (3), E [cn] = cn, E
[
c˜〈n+i〉
]
= c¯e, E
[
c2n
]
= c2n, E
[
cnc˜〈n+i〉
]
= cnc¯e,
E
[
c˜2〈n+i〉
]
=
(
σ2 + c¯2e
)
, with i ∈ L0 and E
[
c˜〈n+i〉c˜〈n+j〉
]
= c¯2, i, j∈L0, i 6=j:
E
[
p˜2〈n〉
]
=E
[(
wl · cn +
∑
i=L0
wl−|i| · c˜〈n+i〉 + kˆ
)2]
E
[(
wl · cn +
∑
i=L0
wl−|i| · c˜〈n+i〉
)2]
+ 2
(
wl · cn +
(
1− wl
)
c¯e
)
kˆ + kˆ2. (40)
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The expected value in the squared brackets can be written as: w2
l
c2n + 2wl
∑
i=L0 wl−|i|c¯ecn +∑
i=L0 w
2
l−|i|E
[
c˜2〈n+i〉
]
+
∑
i 6=j;i,j=L0 wl−|j|wl−|i|E
[
c˜〈n+i〉c˜〈n+j〉
]
, or:
w2
l
c2n + 2wl
(
1− wl
)
c¯ecn +
∑
i=L0
w2
l−|i|σ
2
e +
∑
i,j=L0
wl−|j|wl−|i|c¯
2
e.
Setting WII.0 (N) =
∑
i=L0
(
wl−|i|
)2
and noting that
∑
i,j=L0 wl−|j|wl−|i| =
(
1− wl
)2, we obtain(
wlcn +
(
1− wl
)
c¯e
)2 + σ2eWII.0 (N). Summing up previous results completes the calculation. ♦
Part 7.II Under Assumption 1, if firm n knows its costs but not those of its opponent and in the
final stage prices follow Proposition 1, then
EGe
[
p˜〈n〉p˜〈n−1〉
]
=
(
cnwl−1 +
(
1− wl−1
)
ce + kˆ
)(
cnwl +
(
1− wl
)
ce + kˆ
)
+WII.1 (N)σ2, where
WII.1 (N) =
∑
i=L0 wl−|i|wl−|i+1|.
Derivation of Part 7.II. The proof is similar to that of Part 7.I. Using (3), we obtain:
E
[
p˜〈n〉p˜〈n−1〉
]
= E
[(
wl · cn +
∑
i=L0 wl−|i| · c˜〈n+i〉 + kˆ
)(
wl−1 · cn +
∑
i=L0 wl−|i+1| · c˜〈n+i〉 + kˆ
)]
.
This can be written as:
E
[(
wlcn +
∑
i=L0
wl−|i|c˜〈n+i〉
)(
wl−1cn +
∑
i=L0
wl−|i+1|c˜〈n+i〉
)]
+
+
(
wlcn +
∑
i=L0
wl−|i|c¯e
)
kˆ +
(
wl−1cn +
∑
i=L0
wl−|i+1|c˜〈n+i〉
)
kˆ + kˆ2. Or:
wlwl−1c
2
n + wl
(
1− wl−1
)
cnc¯e + wl−1
(
1− wl
)
cnc¯e +
∑
i=L0
wl−|i|wl−|i+1|
(
σ2 + c¯2e
)
+
∑
i 6=j;i,j=L0
wl−|i|wl−|j+1|c¯
2
e +
(
wl · cn +
(
1− wl
)
c¯e
)
k +
(
wl−1cn +
(
1− wl−1
)
c¯e
)
kˆ + kˆ2.
Noting that
∑
i,j=L0 wl−|i|wl−|j+1| =
(
1− wl
) (
1− wl−1
)
, after some simplifications:
wlwl−1c
2
n + wl
(
1− wl−1
)
cnc¯e + wl−1
(
1− wl
)
cnc¯e +
(
1− wl
) (
1− wl−1
)
c¯2e +WII.1 (N)σ
2 +
+
(
wl · cn +
(
1− wl
)
c¯e
)
kˆ +
(
wl−1cn +
(
1− wl−1
)
c¯e
)
kˆ + kˆ2,
with: WII.1 (N) =
∑
i=L0 wl−|i|wl−|i+1|. The thesis directly follows from factorization. ♦
a) To derive (27), substitute E [p˜n] = wlcn+
(
1− wl
)
c¯e+kˆ, E
[
p˜〈n−1〉
]
= wl−1cn+
(
1− wl−1
)
c¯e
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+kˆ and the results in Parts 7.I and 7.II into (26):
EGe
[
Π˜n|cn, N,M
]
=(
cnwl−1 +
(
1− wl−1
)
c¯e + kˆ
)(
cnwl +
(
1− wl
)
c¯e + kˆ
)
+WII.1σ2
−
((
wlcn +
(
1− wl
)
c¯e
)
+ kˆ
)2
− σ2eWII.0 +
(
wlcn +
(
1− wl
)
c¯e + kˆ − cn
)
kˆ
−cn
(
wl−1cn +
(
1− wl−1
)
c¯e + kˆ
)
+ cn
(
wlcn +
(
1− wl
)
c¯e + kˆ
)
=
(
kˆ + c¯e − cn − cewl + cnwl
)(
kˆ − c¯ewl−1 + cnwl−1 + c¯ewl − cnwl
)
+ (WII.1 −WII.0)σ2e
=
((
1− wl
)
(c¯e − cn) + kˆ
)((
wl − wl−1
)
(c¯e − cn) + kˆ
)
+WII (N)σ2e
=
(
wd (c¯e − cn) + kˆ
)2
+WII (N)σ2e
where wd =
(
1− wl
)
=
(
wl − wl−1
)
and
WII (N) = (WII.1 (N)−WII.0 (N)) =
∑
i=L0 wl−|i|
(
wl−|i+1| − wl−|i|
)
> 0.
To compute W¯II , note that forN large enoughWII (N) '
∑l
i=l
(
yz|i| · yz|i+1|)−∑ii=l (yx−|i|)2−
y
(
yx−1 − y) = y2 x−1−1x−1+1 − y2 (x−1 − 1) = y2x 1−x−11+x−1 = 29√3− 13 = 0.05156 7.
b) For (27) to be decreasing in cn, it sufficient that
(
wd (c¯e − cn) + kˆ
)
≥ 0. First, for every Ge,
|c¯e − cn| ≤ |cH − cL|. Hence
(
wd (c¯e − cn) + kˆ
)
≥ 0 holds if |cH − cL| < 1wd kˆ, which is satisfied
by (12).
Proof of Lemma 3. Omitted.
Proof of Lemma 4. First inequality. By totally differentiating (30) with respect to α∗ and
M , we obtain: dα
∗
dM = −ΦM/Φα which is negative since ΦM < 0 from Lemma 3, and Φα < 0 from
Assumption 2. The second and the third inequalities are derived using similar arguments.
Proof of Lemma 5. Note that ddMEGα∗(M)
[
Π˜n|,M
]
= dα
∗(M)
dM ·Φ [α∗ (M) ,M ]Gα (α∗ (M)) +∫ α∗(M)
cL
d
dM (φ (α
∗ (M) , cn,M, σ)) dG (cn). Since the first addendum is null due to the zero-profit
condition (30), a necessary and sufficient condition for monotonicity is that
∫ α
cL
d
dM φ (α, cn,M, σ) <
0. However a sufficient condition is:
d
dM
φ (α∗ (M) , cn,M, σ) = φα (α∗ (M) , cn,M, σ)
dα∗
dM
+ φM (α∗ (M) , cn,M, σ) < 0, (41)
for any cn ≤ α. Because φM < 0 from Lemma 3 and φα < 0 from Assumption 2.(B), then
φ (cH , cH ,M, σ) > 0 implies dα
∗
dM = 0, and (41) is satisfied. When φ (cH , cH ,M, σ) < 0,
dα∗
dM =
− φMφα+φcn (α
∗ (M) , α∗ (M) ,M, σ). Plugging the previous equation in (41) and dividing by
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−φα (α∗ (M) , cn,M, σ), we obtain:
φM (α∗ (M) , α∗ (M) ,M, σ)
φα (α∗ (M) , α∗ (M) ,M, σ) + φcn (α∗ (M) , α∗ (M) ,M, σ)
<
φM (α∗ (M) , cn,M, σ)
φα (α∗ (M) , cn,M, σ)
, (42)
which holds thanks to Assumption 2.(C).
Proof of Proposition 8. The second and third inequalities are obtained by totally differ-
entiating (33). The first inequality comes from the observation that dividing both sides of (34) the
left-hand side is independent of D.
Proof of Proposition 9. First inequality - Totally differentiating (33), and recalling that
from Lemma 5: ddMEGσα∗(M)
[
Π˜n|,M
]
< 0, it follows that:
sign
[
dMS
dσ
]
=sign
[
d
dσEGσα∗(M)
[
Π˜n|,M
]]
. Note that:
d
dσ
∫ α∗
cL
(φ (α∗, cn,M, σ)) g (cn) dcn =
dα∗
dσ
· φ (α∗, α∗,M, σ) gσ(α∗)− dcL
dσ
· φ (α∗, cL,M, σ) gσ(cL) +
∫ α∗
cL
d
dσ
(φ (α∗, cn,M, σ) gσ(cn)) dcn,
where φ (α∗, α∗,M, σ) = 0. After expanding the last term:
−dcL
dσ
φ (α∗, cL,M, σ) gσ (cL) +
∫ α∗
cL
φ (α∗, cn,M, σ)
dgσ(cn)
dσ
dcn +∫ α∗
cL
(
dα∗
dσ
φα (α∗, cn,M, σ) + φσ (α∗, cn,M, σ)
)
gσ(cn) dcn,
The last term is positive due to Assumption 2.(C) (see also the proof of Lemma 5), therefore
a sufficient condition for dMSdσ > 0 is that the first two terms are positive. Because
dcL
dσ =
1
σ (cL − c¯) < 0 and ddσ gσ (cn) = − 1σ (gσ (cn) + (cn − c¯) dgσ (cn) /dcn), and remembering that
φ (α∗, α∗,M, σ) = 0, then under Assumption 2.(D) dMSdσ > 0 is always satisfied.
(Second inequality) If Φ > 0, then all firms stay in the market: α∗ = cH and therefore dα
∗
dσ > 0.
Otherwise if Φ < 0, then dα
∗
dσ =
dα∗
dM
dMS
dσ < 0, from Lemma 4.
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7 Tables and Figures
Table 1: The sequence of equilibrium prices’ weights (percentage values).
N l l wl wl−1 wl−2 wl−3 wl−4 wl−5 wl−6 wl−7 R
2 0 1 66.667 33.333 0.000
3 −1 1 60.000 20.000 0.000
4 −1 2 58.333 16.667 8.333 0.000
5 −2 2 57.895 15.789 5.263 0.000
6 −2 3 57.778 15.556 4.444 2.222 0.000
7 −3 3 57.747 15.493 4.225 1.408 0.000
8 −3 4 57.738 15.476 4.167 1.190 0.595 0.595
9 −4 4 57.736 15.471 4.151 1.132 0.377 0.755
10 −4 5 57.735 15.470 4.147 1.116 0.319 0.159 0.798
11 −5 5 57.735 15.470 4.146 1.112 0.304 0.101 0.809
12 −5 6 57.735 15.470 4.145 1.111 0.299 0.085 0.043 0.814
13 −6 6 57.735 15.470 4.145 1.111 0.298 0.081 0.027 0.813
14 −6 7 57.735 15.470 4.145 1.111 0.298 0.080 0.023 0.011 0.813
15 −7 7 57.735 15.470 4.145 1.111 0.298 0.080 0.022 0.007 0.813
20 −9 10 57.735 15.470 4.145 1.111 0.298 0.080 0.021 0.006 0.813
∞ −∞ ∞ 57.735 15.470 4.145 1.111 0.298 0.080 0.021 0.006 0.813
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Table 2: The sequence of equilibrium parameters in the Entry Games (percentage values).
N ρc ρ WI WII
2 300.00 300.000 22.222 11.111
3 250.00 69.987 24.000 8.000
4 200.00 62.436 23.611 6.250
5 190.00 61.356 23.269 5.540
6 180.00 61.076 23.111 5.284
7 177.50 61.001 23.051 5.197
8 175.00 60.881 23.030 5.169
9 174.34 60.976 23.023 5.161
10 173.68 60.974 23.021 5.158
11 173.51 60.974 23.020 5.157
12 173.33 60.974 23.020 5.157
13 173.29 60.974 23.020 5.157
14 173.24 60.974 23.020 5.157
15 173.23 60.974 23.020 5.157
20 173.21 60.974 23.020 5.157
∞ 173.21 60.974 23.020 5.157
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Figure 1: The bold line describes the location of the firms. The external dashed circum-
ference denotes the weights given by firm 0 to the costs of the firms located at any other
point. The internal first (second) dashed circumference denotes the weights given by firm
+1 (−1) to the costs of any other firm.
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Figure 2: Expected average total cost. F is the social optimum; M is the free-market
outcome; S is the second best solution (the social planner’s choice of entrants when they
set market prices). Under uniform pricing, the planner’s choice is in U (V is the market
outcome with homogeneous costs).
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Figure 3: The optimal number firms in the pre-entry stage M and in the production stage
N (left scale). Optimal entry threshold (right scale).
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Figure 4: Expected average costs with regulation (uniform and first-best pricing) and
without (free market and market with selection).
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